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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third District 
Court. This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann- § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the trial court erred reversibly in denying 
defendant's motion to exclude evidence of his prior convictions 
pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Aggravated Robbery, a first 
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (Supp. 
1987). 
A jury convicted defendant as charged on July 1, 1987, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
presiding. Judge Moffat sentenced defendant to serve an 
indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 20, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Gilbert 
Martinez, the owner of G.E.M. Music Store, waited on a woman who 
inquired about expensive electric guitars and microphones on 
display at the store (R. 167-8). The woman left after 
ascertaining the store's closing time. An hour later, a man 
wearing dark clothing and a baseball cap rushed into the store 
and ran toward Mr. Martinez, who stood about 30 feet away from 
the store's door (R. 170). Pointing a gun to Mr. Martinez' 
cheek, the man forced him into a back room, made him lay face 
down on the floor and sat on his back (R. 1781-3). With the gun 
pressed against the back of Mr. Martinez' head, the man attempted 
unsuccessfully to remove Mr. Martinez' ring and watch. However, 
the man succeeded in removing some cash from his pockets and 
wallet (R. 173-4). 
A few minutes passed during which Mr. Martinez heard 
the store's front door open a few times, then his captor yelled 
"are you ready?" (R. 174.) A female voice answered 
affirmatively from the front of the store and the man left, 
warning Mr. Martinez to stay down (R. 175). Mr. Martinez 
returned to the empty store and discovered that expensive 
equipment had been stolen (R. 176, 180). 
On July 2, Mr. Martinez positively identified defendant 
from a group of photographs (R. 178). A few days later, Debbie 
Alder was arrested and charged in connection with the robbery of 
the G.E.M. Music Store (R. 262). Ms. Alder, the woman on whom 
Mr. Martinez waited an hour prior to the robbery, named defendant 
as an accomplice in the G.E.M. Music Store robbery (R. 263). A 
few weeks later, Mr. Martinez picked defendant out of a nine-man 
line-up (R. 179). 
At trial, both Mr. Martinez and Ms. Alder identified 
defendant as the perpetrator of the G.E.M. Music Store robbery 
(R. 170, 212). Subsequently, the jury convicted defendant as 
charged. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's prior convictions were admissible under 
either Rule 609(a)(1) or (2). The probative value of the 
convictions for impeachment outweighed their prejudicial effect. 
But this balancing test need not be re-evaluated by this Court 
because defendant's convictions were admissible as crimes 
involving dishonesty under subpart (2). 
Even if the convictions were inadmissible, the trial 
court's ruling was harmless given the lack of a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result if defendant had testified. The 
evidence incriminating defendant was strong compared to 
defendant's unsupported claim that he was elsewhere at the time 
of the robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BURGLARY AND ROBBERY 
CONVICTIONS WERE ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 
609(a)(1) AND (2). 
At the close of the state's case, the trial court 
denied defendant's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence of his 
prior robbery and burglary convictions, finding the evidence 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and (2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (R. 242). Subsequently, defendant decided not to take 
the stand, allegedly, to avoid the introduction of his prior 
convictions. On appeal, he claims that the trial court's ruling 
was erroneous and that the error was prejudicial because it 
deprived him of the opportunity to testify in his own defense. 
In deciding evidentiary issues, the trial court 
exercises broad discretionary powers. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 
1032, 1035 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, the reviewing court should 
not reverse the trial court's rulings on those matters unless "it 
is manifest that the court so abused its discretion that there is 
a likelihood that injustice resulted." Icl. at 1035. In the 
instant case, the trial court ruled that evidence of defendant's 
prior convictions was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and (2). 
Defendant's prior convictions were admissible under 
Rule 609(a)(1). 
Under Rule 609(a)(1) the court may admit such evidence 
given the following two conditions: (1) defendant's prior 
convictions must have been punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year; and (2) the evidence's probative value 
outweighs its prejudicial effect. Here, the admissibility of 
defendant's prior convictions under the first condition is 
undisputed. However, defendant contends that the burglary and 
robbery convictions were more prejudicial than probative and 
should not have been admitted. 
In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986), 
this Court set forth the following five factors to be considered 
in deciding whether evidence of prior convictions is more 
probative than prejudicial under Rule 609(a)(1): 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on 
the character for veracity of the witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior 
conviction. . . 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the 
charged crime, insofar as a close resemblance 
may lead the jury to punish the accused as a 
bad person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in 
determining the truth in a prosecution tried 
without decisive nontestimonial evidence. . . 
[5] the importance of the accused's 
testimony, as perhaps warranting the 
exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused's character for veracity. . . 
In the instant case, there are admittedly factors which weigh 
against admission, such as the remoteness of the burglary 
convictions and the similarity of the robbery conviction to the 
trial charges. However, the weight of those factors alone is 
insufficient to conclude that in admitting the evidence, the 
trial court so abused its discretion that "there is a likelihood 
that injustice resulted." 
First, unlike the offenses involved in Banner and 
Gentry, the offenses for which defendant was previously convicted 
are relevant to defendant's credibility. In Banner and Gentry, 
the defendant's prior convictions involved forcible sexual 
offenses which this Court found irrelevant to ascertain the 
defendant's character for veracity. In the instant case, 
defendant was previously convicted of burglary and robbery. Both 
offenses reflect on defendant's credibility, not because as 
defendant accuses the state of arguing, people who commit one 
crime are more likely to commit another, but because people who 
have committed crimes in the past are more likely to try to cover 
up their responsibility in the crime on trial to avoid the 
harsher penalties associated with having been previously 
convicted. 
Secondly, as defendant contends, "credibility issues" 
at trial were crucial in this case. However, while defendant 
seems to conclude that this factor weighs against the 
admissibility of the impeaching evidence, in fact, the importance 
of his credibility makes the investigation into defendant's 
character for veracity all the more necessary. Defendant 
advanced his intent to introduce at trial an alibi defense, and 
the only testimony offered by defendant pursuant to his alibi 
The requirement that the defendant's prior crime be 
indicative of his character for veracity under the factors set 
forth in Banner must be distinguished from a similar requirement 
contained in Rule 609(a)(2) Utah R. Evid. (1987). Under that 
rule prior convictions are admissible to impeach a witness so 
long as the prior crimes involve "dishonesty" or "false 
statement," regardless of whether the convictions are punishable 
by death or more than one year imprisonment. The Banner 
requirement must be construed more narrowly than that contained 
in Rule 609(a)(2). Otherwise, a finding under this single factor 
would render the evidence admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), and 
Rule 609(a)(1) Utah R. Evid. repetitive and unnecessary. 
defense was his own. Absent any other supporting evidence, 
defendant's credibility becomes crucial for the jury's resolution 
of the case. Thus, the evidence was important to the State for 
the very reason that defendant wanted to exclude it, and under 
the fourth factor enumerated by this Court in Banner, the 
centrality of defendant's credibility weighs in favor of 
admissibility. 
Further, not fully disregarding the importance of 
defendant's testimony at trial, his testimony was not so crucial 
that it warranted the exclusion of evidence indicative of his 
credibility. Given the fact that defendant never did take the 
stand, it is hard to accurately determine how his testimony would 
2 have affected the outcome of the trial. Defendant contends that 
his testimony was crucial to advance an alibi defense alleging 
that he was not the man identified by the state's witnesses. 
This testimony would have been in direct conflict with the 
testimony of two state witnesses who identified defendant as the 
perpetrator (R. 170, 212), and the victim's two prior 
identifications of defendant, first from a picture line-up (R. 
178) and then from a live line-up (R. 179). Moreover, defendant 
had an opportunity to and did attack the witnesses' testimony by 
impeaching their identification of him (R. 184-207, 215-217). 
Yet, the jury chose to believe the witnesses testimony. 
Defendant's testimony was not so crucial as to warrant the 
This sort of difficulty played a crucial role in this 
Court's decision in Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035, 1036 to 
prospectively require that a defendant testify at trial in order 
to preserve a Rule 609(a) objection for appeal. 
exclusion of evidence of his prior convictions, especially in 
light of the fact set forth above that the convictions were 
central to the issue of defendant's credibility and the outcome 
of the case. 
Finally, while the prior crimes for which defendant was 
convicted are quite similar to the offense charged, this factor 
does not per se exclude the impeaching evidence. Such an 
exclusionary rule "would lead to the unreasonable result of 
treating more favorably a defendant who has committed the type of 
crime charged more than once than one whose earlier crimes were 
different." State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 97 (Or. 1984) (quotation 
omitted). Thus, although the fact that the prior crimes for 
which defendant was convicted are similar to the instant charge 
counts against admission, a balance of all factors as set forth 
above supports the trial court's decision admitting defendant's 
prior convictions for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1). 
B. Defendant's Prior Convictions Were 
Admissible Under Rule 609(a)(2). 
Unlike Rule 609(a)(1) discussed above, which allows the 
trial court discretion in determining the admissibility of the 
impeaching evidence, Rule 609(a)(2) requires an automatic 
admission of a witness' prior convictions involving "crimes of 
dishonesty or false statement," in order to impeach his or her 
testimony. Defendant apparently concedes that the language of 
the rule excludes any balancing test for this category of crimes 
since he focuses on whether his crimes fit the category rather 
than on any claim that further requirements exist. Thus, in the 
instant case, the only issue under Rule 609(a)(2) is whether 
robbery and burglary, the crimes of which defendant was 
previously convicted, involve "dishonesty or false statement" 
within the meaning of the rule. 
As defendant correctly points out, this Court has not 
yet defined crimes of dishonesty or false statement under Rule 
609(a)(2). However, in State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 
1984), this Court unequivocally ruled that theft is a crime of 
dishonesty under former Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
This Court's decision in Cintron, decided after the adoption of 
the new Rules of Evidence in 1983, has not been overruled and is 
controlling. 
Defendant argues that this Court should disregard 
Cintron, claiming that it is "old law" and inconsistent with the 
purpose of the current rules. (App. Br. at 6, n. 3.) Yet, 
defendant fails to demonstrate that Cintron is inconsistent with 
the new Rules. On the contrary, Rule 609(a) differs from Rule 21 
only in that it imposed a new limitation on the admissibility of 
prior felony convictions (i.e., crimes punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year) for impeachment purposes. 
Accordingly, under Rule 609(a)(1), the trial court must weigh the 
evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect before 
4 
prior felonies can be admitted. Rule 609(a)(2), however, 
contains exactly the same requirements for admissibility of 
See Cintron, 680 P.2d at 34. 
4 
Compare former Rule 21 which allowed, under the 
statutory exception provision, for the automatic admission of 
felony convictions for impeachment purposes. See Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-24-9 (1953, as amended) (superseded by Rule 609(a)(1) Utah 
R. Evid. (Supp. 1983). 
crimes involving "dishonesty or false statement" as the old 
rule. Therefore, Cintron is consistent with the new Rules of 
Evidence and should not be overruled. 
In the instant case, defendant's prior convictions were 
of burglary and robbery, not theft, as in Cintron. Nevertheless, 
the three crimes are similar in that they are all indicative of 
dishonesty but do not involve false statement as obviously and 
clearly as does perjury. Yet, like fraud or embezzlement, 
burglary and robbery are deceitful acts or crimes of dishonesty. 
The burglar who secretly enters the private home concealing his 
or her presence in that home is surely dishonest. And the 
robber's dishonesty is demonstrated in cases such as this one 
where, pursuant to a criminal plan, the robber enters a store 
posing as a customer and later on, disguises himself to avoid 
identification. 
Obviously, the two crimes do not necessarily involve 
verbal false statement; however, there is no reason to conclude 
that only verbal false statement is indicative of a witness' 
propensity to lie. A failure to speak can often be as deceitful 
as an affirmative lie. Both fraud and embezzlement can be 
accomplished without an affirmative lie. As defendant points 
out, both fraud and embezzlement have been found to satisfy the 
rule. (App. Br. at 6 citing United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 
348, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Like theft, fraud and embezzlement, 
burglary and robbery are crimes involving dishonesty within the 
Compare former Rule 21 Utah R. Evid. with Rule 
609(a)(2) Utah R. Evid. (1987). 
meaning of Rule 609(a)(2) and therefore, automatically admissible 
for impeaching purposes. 
Other courts have ruled that the theft-burglary-robbery 
type of crimes are admissible as crimes of "dishonesty" under 
Rule 609(a)(2). In United States v. Bianco, 419 F. Supp. 507 
(E.D.Pa. 976), aff'd. 547 F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1977), the district 
court ruled that a prior conviction for breaking and entering, 
and armed robbery were crimes of dishonesty. The court thus 
admitted the convictions for the limited purpose of impeachment. 
See also, United States v. Ackridqe, 370 F. Supp. 214, 218 (E.D. 
Pa. 1973) aff'd, 500 F.2d 1400 (1974); United States v. Gray, 468 
F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v. Baber, 447 F.2d 1267, 
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert, denied 404 U.S. 957 (1971). 
Concededly, as defendant argues, other jurisdictions 
have excluded robbery specifically from admission under Rule 
609(a)(2) and burglary by implication. However, those decisions 
are not binding on Utah. Cintron, on the other hand, provides a 
Utah precedent which defines theft, a crime very much like those 
involved in the instant case, within the ambit of crimes 
involving dishonesty and false statement. Therefore, the trial 
court correctly denied defendant's motion to exclude evidence of 
his prior burglary and robbery convictions. 
C. The Trial Court's Denial Of Defendant's 
Motion To Exclude Evidence Of His Prior 
Convictions Constitutes, At Most, Harmless 
Error. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in 
failing to exclude evidence of defendant's prior convictions for 
robbery and burglary, under both 609(a)(1) and (2), such error 
does not warrant a reversal of defendant's conviction. In 
Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038, this Court stated the standard of 
review relevant to this case as follows: 
[T]he standard for error in cases involving a 
wrongful failure to exclude prior convictions 
is whether "there was 'a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant.'" (Quotations omitted.) 
In the instant case, it is highly unlikely that the 
exclusion of evidence of defendant's prior crimes would have 
exchanged the outcome of the trial. The identity of defendant as 
the man implicated in the G.E.M. Music Store robbery was the only 
issue in dispute at trial, and the evidence identifying him as 
the perpetrator was strong. A few days after the robbery, the 
victim picked defendant's photograph out of a picture line-up (R. 
178). A few days later, one of the perpetrators of that same 
robbery, named him as an accomplice (R. 262). Soon thereafter, 
the victim picked defendant out of a nine-man line up (R. 179). 
Finally, both witnesses identified defendant during trial. While 
it is true that Mr. Martinez also picked a photograph of another 
man during an initial photo line-up and may have said he was 90% 
sure it was the robber, it was unnecessary for defendant to 
testify to test this evidence adequately by cross examination of 
Mr. Martinez. 
Nevertheless, defendant claims that had he been allowed 
to testify he would have convinced the jury that he was elsewhere 
at the time of the robbery. In order to prevail, however, 
defendant had to convince the jury, without any supporting 
evidence that, at the time of the robbery, he was somewhere else. 
Further, defendant's testimony had to convince the jury against 
the weight of the witnesses' prior identification of him as the 
perpetrator, by name, through picture line-up and through live 
line-up. In addition, defendant's testimony had to be so 
convincing as to lead the jury to believe that, not one, but two 
unrelated witnesses lied before the trial and then on the stand 
in a plot to implicate him in the robbery. 
Given the overwhelming evidence identifying defendant 
as the perpetrator of the G.E.M. Music Store robbery, and the 
weakness of defendant's proposed alibi testimony, defendant's 
testimony would not have altered the outcome of the trial. 
Therefore, even if the trial court erred in failing to exclude 
evidence of defendant's prior convictions, and even if that error 
motivated defendant's decision not to testify, the trial court's 
error is harmless and defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
DATED t h i s / 7 # f day of 0Cfv£&C , 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^ 5 ^ / . 
SANDRA L. SJ( 
A s s i s t a n t Atftorfiey General 
In fact, defense counsel unsuccessfully attempted to 
impeach the testimony of the two witnesses by pointing out 
weaknesses in each witnesses' testimony. For example, counsel 
extensively cross-examined Ms. Alder intimating that she 
identified defendant as an accomplice in order to protect someone 
else who supplied her with drugs (R. 215-217). 
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